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Introduction
Why do entrepreneurs invest a large share of their wealth in their own firms, despite the high risk associated with such an undiversified portfolio? The entrepreneurial risk-taking is not compensated by a premium on expected returns, as documented by Moskowitz and VissingJorgensen (2002) , and thus represents, in their wording, a 'private equity premium puzzle '. 2 One possible explanation for the puzzle may be that external financing may be costly in imperfect financial markets due to asymmetric information (Gentry and Hubbard, 2004, page 21) . In other words, entrepreneurs would like to diversify, but face credit constraints. Hintermaier and Steinberger (2005) present a theoretical model of occupational choice over the life cycle under borrowing constraints and imperfect information about the profitability of potential businesses, which is able to generate the empirical finding. An alternative explanation may be lower risk aversion of entrepreneurs (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002 , page 772; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004, page 21f) . In this case, entrepreneurs' portfolios may result from unconstrained individual optimization, and the private equity premium puzzle does not necessarily indicate frictions in the capital market.
This paper provides the first empirical investigation of the heterogeneous risk tolerance explanation by analyzing the relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial investment. The results confirm the hypothesis that higher individual risk tolerance increases both the probability of holding private business equity, and its share in the asset portfolio conditional on ownership. The most risk tolerant individuals have an 8 times higher probability of owning private business equity than the most risk averse individuals, and the portfolio share of the most risk tolerant entrepreneurs is 31.5 % higher than that of the most risk averse entrepreneurs.
Recent literature has provided evidence that lower risk aversion increases the probability of being or becoming an entrepreneur (van Praag and Cramer, 2001; Cramer et al., 2002; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2008) . Consistently with that, the self-employed are found to be less risk averse than employees Barsky et al., 1997) . As this literature already shows that low risk aversion is an important characteristic of entrepreneurship, it is straightforward to proceed further and investigate the relationship with entrepreneurial investment.
3 In contrast to the existing literature, this analysis addresses potential endogeneity of the risk attitude.
The new evidence on risk aversion and entrepreneurial investment is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel, a large, representative panel survey of the German population. Besides a rich variety of socio-economic background variables, it provides information on personal wealth, asset portfolios, and measures of individual risk attitudes.
The behavioral relevance of the survey measures of risk attitudes has been validated in a field experiment by Dohmen et al. (2005) . Section 2 describes the data in more detail. The empirical methodology in this paper, as discussed in section 3, takes into account both observed and unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of the risk attitude. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and section 5 concludes with policy implications.
Data on Private Equity and Risk Attitudes
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is provided by the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin), is a representative yearly panel survey covering about 22,000 individuals living in 12,000 households in Germany. Wagner et al. (2007) provide a detailed description of the data. The waves of 2002 and 2007 included a special module collecting information about private wealth. The interviewers asked for the market value of personally owned real estate (owner-occupied housing, other property, mortgage debt), financial assets, tangible assets, private life and pension insurance, consumer credits, and, most importantly for this analysis, private business equity (net market value; own share in case of a business partnership). The wording of the question for private equity is reported in Appendix B. In contrast to a similar wealth module in the SOEP questionnaire of 1988, which collected wealth information at the household level, in 2002 and 2007 the information was elicited at the individual level (for a discussion see Frick et al., 2007 Thus, gross wealth is defined as wealth which is convertible into cash on the market and does not include human capital or statutory pension insurance entitlements. Mortgage debt on owner-occupied housing and other property and consumer credits are not deducted (this 4 With regard to owner-occupied housing, other property, and financial assets, respondents are asked to state the total value and the share they personally own. The variables used in equation (2) and reported in The wave 2004 additionally included a measure of risk attitudes using lottery choices, and questions for the willingness to take risks in specific domains. In this paper only the question about the general willingness to take risks is used, as this is the only risk question repeated in 2006. Furthermore, the experiment by Dohmen et al. (2005) showed that this measure performs better than the lottery measure in predicting behavior. 6 The results remain largely the same if farmers are included, although some of the standard errors increase. 7 The results are robust with respect to observations with missing values, see footnote 10. 2007. This is consistent with the literature analyzing the portfolio composition of entrepreneurs in the U.S.A. (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004; Heaton and Lucas, 2000) .
As Figure 1 shows, the data clearly suggest a positive relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial investment. With increasing risk tolerance, the share of observations with a positive amount of private business equity (entrepreneurs) increases, as well as the unconditional portfolio share of private business equity, and the portfolio share conditional on being an entrepreneur. The bumps in the conditional portfolio share which deviate from a monotonically increasing function could easily be explained by sampling error, as the sample only includes 726 observations with positive business value. In the following, econometric techniques will be used to control for observed and unobserved factors in order to ensure that this is not a spurious relationship. 
where ν i is an unobserved random effect, and ε it is the error term. The observed portfolio share s it is expressed as
Under the assumptions that ν i is i.i.d., N(0, σ ν 2 ), and ε it is i.i.d., N(0, σ ε 2 ), independently of ν i , the model is specified as a random effects two-limit tobit model (cf. Wooldridge, 2002) .
The vector x it controls for factors which may influence entrepreneurial investment and which may be correlated with risk aversion. The personal financial situation is accounted for by the variables net worth (gross wealth minus mortgage and other debt, in €100,000) and its square, gross labor income (in €1,000), and the individual average income tax rate (ATR).
The ATR is calculated as
net after tax income ATR gross before tax income = − .
As both income concepts are asked for in the SOEP questionnaire at the household level, this approach takes into account that married couples are taxed jointly with full income splitting in The following will discuss the model assumptions of this baseline specification which may be critical for the results. Alternative econometric models will be employed additionally to assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to these assumptions.
First, the risk attitude measured on the scale from 0 to 10 may have a nonlinear effect on entrepreneurial investment. Thus, the risk measure risk it will be replaced by a vector of 11 dummy variables in an alternative specification, allowing for maximal flexibility. Third, the control variables net worth, labor income, and ATR, may be problematic.
Measurement error in the value of private equity would change both s it on the left hand side and net worth on the right hand side of equation (3) in the same direction, as private equity is used to calculate both quantities. Thus, such measurement error would bias the coefficient of net worth upward, in contrast to the usual downward attenuation bias introduced by measurement error. Labor income may be endogenous, as a higher portfolio share of private business equity may generate higher income from self-employment, although the portfolio share not only depends on the amount invested in the business, but also on the leverage decision. Given the focus of this paper, the potential endogeneity of these control variables would be relevant if they introduced bias in the coefficient of the variable measuring the risk attitude risk it . The model will thus be re-estimated omitting net worth, labor income, and the individual ATR (because of its correlation with labor income) to see if this changes the coefficients of risk it .
Fourth, the tobit model is potentially sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity of the error term ε it . This assumption is relaxed in an alternative tobit model with heteroskedastic errors. Here, the variance is specified flexibly as
where x h it equals x it excluding the constant.
Fifth, the tobit specification implies that the ownership and portfolio decisions are determined by the same parameters. Intuitively it seams reasonable that personal factors which increase the probability of a positive amount of private equity also increase its expected conditional portfolio share. Poterba and Samwick (2002) used the tobit specification to estimate a portfolio choice model of various financial assets (not including private business equity). They tested and did not reject the tobit specification; the same result applies to this application (see below). A more general alternative to the tobit model is a model with selection, which allows the determinants of ownership to differ from the determinants of the conditional portfolio share. This approach was taken by King and Leape (1998) , who estimated the asset portfolio composition of US households (again excluding private business equity because of data limitations). The decision to hold private business equity, or of being an entrepreneur in this sense, is modeled in a selection equation
The latent variable model of the portfolio share of private business equity is now specified as
and the observed portfolio share is
The error terms w it and u it are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation ρ. This model with selection (Heckman, 1979) is estimated using the FIML estimator. Censoring at 1, which occurs very seldom as mentioned above, is neglected in this specification. For better identification of the selection effect, the dummy variable indicating a self-employed father is used as an exclusion restriction not entering x p it in the portfolio equation (7), which is otherwise equal to x it . A self-employed father is likely to influence the probability of being an entrepreneur (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000) , but is not expected to have a direct impact on the leverage and portfolio allocation decisions after controlling for the other factors.
In comparison to the tobit specification, this model with selection has the advantage of being more general. The disadvantage is that the number of parameters to be estimated almost doubles, so they cannot be estimated as precisely. Again, the model will additionally be estimated using the two instrumental variables for the risk attitude in equation (7). Moreover, in this model equation (7) can be estimated with fixed effects. This is an alternative method of controlling for unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics which may both be correlated with the risk attitude and entrepreneurial investment, such as entrepreneurial ability. The fixed effects estimation does not require the assumption that the unobserved individual effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which is necessary for the random effects estimation of equation (3), and may thus be regarded more robust. The estimation results based on the models with selection will be presented as a robustness check in section 4.3. Table 2 summarizes all the alternative specifications employed. Table 3 shows the estimated tobit coefficients for equation ( Tobit (5). Excluding net worth, gross labor income and the ATR from model RE Tobit (2) somewhat increases the point estimate for the coefficient of risk tolerance. 10 In the model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity, Heter. Tobit (5), all explanatory variables in x it were 10 The estimated coefficient of the risk attitude also remains similar if net worth is represented by 6 interval dummies instead of the level and the square. The variables net worth, gross income, and the ATR, are the ones which most often suffer from item non-response. Excluding these variables, it was possible to additionally estimate model RE Tobit (2) on a larger sample of 14,834 observations. The results are very similar, suggesting that the coefficient of risk tolerance is not sensitive to selection on missing information. All results not reported in the tables are available from the author upon request.
Estimation Results

Results from the Tobit Models
included to specify the heteroscedasticity, but only the significant variables are shown for brevity. In line with the presence of significant variables in the heteroscedasticity equation, homoscedasticity is rejected by an LM test. The estimated coefficient of risk tolerance changes only slightly in the model allowing for heteroscedasticity, however, so it is robust to the neglect of heteroscedasticity.
In the IV estimation, IV Tobit (4), the coefficient of interest remains positive and significant. 11 The point estimate is almost 10 times larger than in the baseline estimation, and the standard error is even 30 times larger. The higher point estimate in the IV estimation indicates that the coefficient of risk tolerance may be biased downwards in the baseline estimation. One reason may be that measurement error in the risk attitude leads to downward attenuation bias in the baseline estimation. IV estimation reduces the noise, particularly because body height can be measured with more precision. As the standard error in the IV estimation becomes very large, the coefficient of risk tolerance is imprecisely estimated, and the coefficient in the baseline estimation is still included in its 90-% confidence interval.
Despite the low precision, the larger point estimate reinforces the finding that risk tolerance has a positive and significant effect on the portfolio share of private business equity. The result alleviates possible concerns that risk attitudes might be positively correlated with unobserved entrepreneurial ability, which in turn might be positively correlated with the portfolio share of private business equity. This would result in a lower point estimate emerging from IV estimation. The instrumental variables height and motherhighersec are jointly significant at the 1 % level (Wald χ 2 2 = 20.46) in the "first stage" regression of risk tolerance on the instrument set, which additionally includes all explanatory variables in x it .
The coefficients of height and motherhighersec reported in the table are estimated jointly with 11 410 observations provide no information about their body height or their mother's education level and have to be excluded from the IV models. The results are similar if the mother's education is not used and the IV estimation relies solely on the body height, although this instrument alone is weaker. In this case, only 7 observations have to be excluded.
the tobit coefficients in the FIML estimation. The test of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected at the 10 % level. A Wald test rejects exogeneity of the risk attitude at the 10 % level, but not at the 5 % level. The fact, that exogeneity is not rejected very strongly, increases confidence in the baseline estimation.
In specification RE Tobit (3), risk it is represented by 10 dummy variables, which allows for arbitrary nonlinear effects. The omitted base category is risk0, which indicates the highest risk aversion on the 11-point scale. A slightly higher risk tolerance indicated by risk1 and risk2 has a positive influence on the portfolio share in comparison to the base category, but the difference is not yet significant. The point estimates of the coefficients of the dummy variables risk3 to risk10 are significant and increase monotonically with higher risk tolerance.
This result strongly supports the hypothesized positive relationship between risk tolerance and entrepreneurial investment.
In the three RE tobit models, the point estimates for the standard error of the unobserved random effect σ ν are positive, and σ ν = 0 is rejected by a likelihood ratio test at the 1 % level.
Although the efficiency of the models is improved by controlling for random effects, the coefficient of risk tolerance in the baseline model is robust to omitting the random effect, as indicated by the results from model Heter. Tobit (5) without random effects.
The results from estimating the models on the 2007 data only are shown in Table 4 . As In the tobit models (6), which corresponds to the baseline specification, (7) with the reduced set of explanatory variables, and (10) with heteroscedasticity, the point estimates for the coefficient of risk tolerance are larger than in the estimations based on the full sample. 12 The point estimate in the baseline model RE Tobit (1) estimated on the full sample, γ = 0.0502, is still included in the corresponding 95-% confidence intervals in models (6) This interpretation is in line with prospect theory, which predicts that entrepreneurs who have lost on their business are willing to take high risks in order to get a chance to offset the loss.
In any case, the higher point estimates in the models based on the 2007 sample reassure that risk tolerance has a positive influence on entrepreneurial investment, and the lower point estimates in the models based on the full sample are the more conservative estimates.
The results from the specification with dummy variables for the risk attitude, Tobit (8),
are similar to the results based on the full sample, although the coefficients are less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size. The point estimates of the coefficients of risk9 and risk10 become larger, in line with the findings reported above, but the point estimates based on the full sample remain within the 95-% confidence intervals.
The coefficient of risk tolerance in the IV estimation (9) is estimated to be much larger than in the models without IV, which replicates the findings based on the full sample. The standard error becomes so large due to the small sample size that the coefficient is not even significantly different from 0, however. The coefficients of height and motherhighersec in a regression of risk tolerance on the instrument set are still jointly highly significant (Wald χ 2 2 = 12.41). Exogeneity of the risk attitude is not rejected by the Wald test here (p-value = 0.352). This supports the idea that limiting the sample to the wave of 2007 and using the lagged risk attitude avoids the endogeneity problem, and confirms the validity of the models without IV in the limited sample.
Many of the control variables, which are reported completely in Table 3 and in part in Table 4 , are found to significantly influence the portfolio share of private business equity. Net worth has a positive effect at slightly diminishing rates. This may be interpreted as an indication for the presence of liquidity constraints in the sense of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) , although Hurst and Lusardi (2004) casted doubt on this explanation. The positive effect of net worth on entrepreneurial investment found in this analysis would then suggests that less wealthy people who would like to start up a business face constraints due to imperfect financial markets, and that less wealthy entrepreneurs are similarly constrained if they want to reduce the portfolio share of their business by taking on debt. In this case, capital constraints may be an additional explanation for the private business equity premium puzzle, besides the role played by heterogeneous risk attitudes.
Both gross labor income and the ATR are found to have a positive influence on the portfolio share. The positive effect of the ATR is in line with the theoretical predictions and empirical results of Cullen and Gordon (2007) . One mechanism through which higher income taxes may encourage entrepreneurship is the implied sharing of risk with the government (see also Fossen, 2007) . Better tax avoidance and evasion opportunities for the self-employed in comparison to the dependently employed may also make entrepreneurship more attractive in the presence of higher taxes, although the empirical evidence is mixed (Parker, 1996 and 2003) . In any case, the coefficient of risk tolerance is not sensitive to the exclusion of the variables related to net worth and income, as mentioned above. Furthermore, entrepreneurial investment is lower for women and higher for older people, which confirms results from the literature (Wagner, 2007 , investigated the gender effect). As expected, a self-employed father also has a positive influence.
Effects on the Ownership Probability and Portfolio Share of Private Equity
The effect of risk attitudes on entrepreneurial investment is twofold. First, they influence the probability of owning private business equity, which can be interpreted as the decision to be an entrepreneur. Second, they influence the share of private business equity in the asset portfolio, conditional on owning private equity. The size of both effects can be calculated using the estimated tobit models. The marginal effects of the measure of risk tolerance risk it on the probability of owning private business equity, , and given a zero random effect. The standard errors are calculated using the delta method. Table 5 shows the estimated marginal effects of risk tolerance on the probability of ownership and the conditional portfolio share of private equity, which are estimated based on the different specifications and samples. The baseline model RE Tobit (1) yields the smallest and thus most conservative point estimates of both effects, except for a smaller effect on the probability of ownership based on model Heter. Tobit (5). In the baseline model, an increase of the risk tolerance by one point on the 11-point scale increases the probability of holding private business equity by 0.65 percentage points. Given that the expected probability of owning private equity is 4.72 % at the mean values of the explanatory variables, this corresponds to a relative increase of 13.8 %. The portfolio share of private equity, conditional on owning a positive amount, increases by 0.48 percentage points if the risk tolerance grows by one point on the 11-point scale. The expected conditional portfolio share of private business equity is 28.56 %, again evaluated at mean x, so the relative increase is 1.68 %.
( )
Thus, the estimated relative effect of risk attitudes on the decision to be an entrepreneur is much higher than the relative effect on the conditional portfolio share of private business equity.
The estimated marginal effects based on the different tobit specifications are all significantly positive at the 5 % level, except for the effects estimated using model IV Tobit (9) on the 2007 data. The estimated marginal effects in the baseline estimation RE Tobit (1) reported above lie within the 90-% confidence intervals of the estimated effects in the other models, except for model Tobit (7), which yields larger marginal effects. Table 6 presents the estimated effects of the dummy variables capturing the risk attitude risk it alternatively to the linear variable. These are the effects of discrete changes of one of the risk dummy variables from 0 to 1, evaluated at a value of 0 for the other risk dummies, and at the mean values of the other explanatory variables. In model RE Tobit (3), the estimated effects, both on the ownership probability and on the conditional portfolio share, grow monotonically with increasing risk tolerance, starting from risk3. The effects of the low levels of risk tolerance risk1 and risk2 are not significantly different from the effect of the base category risk0 (highest risk aversion). There are remarkably stronger effects for the most risk tolerant people. Those indicating the highest level of risk tolerance, risk10, have an 11.28
percentage-points higher probability of owning private business equity than those in the base category with the lowest level of risk tolerance. Thus, they are 8 times more likely to be entrepreneurs than the most risk averse, whose expected probability is only 1.37 %. The conditional portfolio share of private business equity of the most risk tolerant entrepreneurs is 7.83 percentage points larger than the portfolio share of the most risk-averse entrepreneurs.
As the conditional portfolio share of the latter is predicted to be 24.90 %, this corresponds to a relative effect of 31.45 %. In model Tobit (8), which is estimated using the wave of 2007 only, the estimated effects are even stronger. The point estimates from model RE Tobit (3) lie within the 95-% confidence intervals, however. equity, but it is not statistically significant in these models with selection. Here, the identification of the influence of risk attitudes on the portfolio share must rely solely on those observations with positive holdings of private business equity. As the number of these observations is low, the standard errors are large. It turns out that the correlation between the error terms in the selection equation (6) and the portfolio share equation (7) is not statistically significant. The hypothesis that ρ = 0 is not rejected by Wald tests in the FIML models (11), (12), and (13), with p-value = 0.71 and larger, and the inverse Mill's ratio is insignificant in the two-step models (14) and (15).
Robustness Check: Results from the Selection Models
The estimated marginal effects of risk tolerance on the conditional portfolio share of private business equity, ( )
s z risk x risk ∂ > ∂ , are reported on the right side of Table 5 and can be compared directly to the conditional marginal effects based on the tobit models. 13 The conditional marginal effects based on the model including the net worth and income related variables (11) and the model excluding these variables (12) are larger than the one based on model RE Tobit (1), although the latter still lies within their 95-% confidence intervals.
In the IV estimation with selection, IV Heckit (14), both the coefficient of risk tolerance and its standard error (as well as the conditional marginal effect) become substantially larger, similarly to the findings based on the IV tobit models. The large point estimate of the coefficient again indicates that the estimations without IV may be downward biased. The large standard error is due to the inefficiency of the IV method.
In the fixed effects estimation with selection, FE Heckit (15), the point estimate for the coefficient of risk tolerance is 3.7 times larger than in model Heckit (11) without fixed effects. As the standard error is also larger, the coefficient is still not significantly different from zero. The coefficient is imprecisely estimated, because using the fixed effects method, Using dummy variables to describe the risk attitude in model Heckit (13), all corresponding coefficients except for risk1 are positive and significant. 14 The coefficient and also the effect on the conditional portfolio share (reported in Table 6 ) are largest for the highest level of risk tolerance, risk10. The levels of risk tolerance indicated by risk3 to risk5 have a larger effect on the conditional portfolio share in this specification than risk6 to risk9.
Apart from risk3 to risk5, the effect is still increasing with higher risk tolerance. Given the standard errors, the hypothesis of a monotonically increasing function of the risk tolerance cannot be rejected. At all levels of risk tolerance other than the base category, which indicates 14 The number of observations in the 11 different risk classes becomes small in the second step of the model with selection, which is based on entrepreneurs only. To increase the number of observations, in model Heckit (13) mean values are imputed for observations which have missing values in gross labor income or the ATR. This is not deemed critical, as the coefficients of these variables are insignificant in all the models reported in Table A 3. complete unwillingness to take risks, the estimated effect on the conditional portfolio share is higher than in the tobit specifications, which thus remain the more conservative estimates. (6), which describes the probability of owning private business equity. Here the coefficients of risk tolerance are not only positive, but also statistically significant. The coefficients reported under the column title Probit (11) in Table A 4 and under Heckit (11) in Table A 3 are estimated jointly using the FIML estimator. The same applies to Probit (12) and Heckit (12), as well as Probit (13) and Heckit (13). In contrast, the models IV Heckit (14) Additionally, results of a probit estimation with height and motherhighersec as IVs for risk tolerance are presented under IV Probit (16). The IV estimation yields a substantially larger probit coefficient, which remains significant despite its increased standard error. This points to a possible downward bias of the probit coefficients without IV and is consistent with the result from model IV Tobit (4).
The estimated marginal effects of the risk attitude on the probability of ownership of private business equity based on the probit models,
presented in the first column of Table 5 , models (11) to (15). The effects on the ownership probability are positive and significant and larger than the effect obtained from the baseline model RE Tobit (1), although the latter is still included in the 95-% confidence intervals except for model (12). In summary, the results from the models with selection show that the effects of risk tolerance both on the ownership probability and on the conditional portfolio share of private business equity based on the baseline model RE Tobit (1) are unlikely to be overestimated and may rather be underestimated.
15
The more general model with selection can be used to assess the validity of the tobit specification. If the tobit specification is correct, the estimated ratio of the tobit coefficients over the standard error of the error term should not be statistically different from the estimated probit coefficients on the same variables. The test is conducted using the estimation results from model Tobit (6) (1), but without the random effects, as the random effects tobit model is not directly comparable to the probit model. It turns out that the ratios based on the tobit models indeed lie within the 95-% confidence intervals of the corresponding coefficients in the probit models for all the explanatory variables except for net worth and its square. The coefficients of net worth and its square also pass the test based on model Tobit (6) if the confidence intervals for the probit coefficients are calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. In any case, the signs of these coefficients are the same in the tobit and probit models. As the coefficient of risk tolerance is not sensitive to the exclusion of the net worth variables (see above), in summary the tobit model seems to be appropriate for the purpose of this study.
16
A further robustness check was conducted regarding public start-up subsidies for the unemployed. A dummy variable indicating if an entrepreneur started up her business during the previous year with the help of a public subsidy known as "Ich-AG" ("Me-Incorporation") was included in the vector of control variables x p it in the otherwise identical models with 15 The estimated effects on the ownership probability based on the dummy variables probit model, which are shown on the left side of Table 6 , under the column heading Heckit (13), increase monotonically with increasing risk tolerance and are significant starting from risk3. The effects based on model RE Tobit (3) lie within the 95-% confidence intervals except for the medium range of risk4-risk7, which are estimated smaller using model Heckit (13). Taken together, the results from the dummy variable models suggest that a medium range of risk tolerance has smaller positive effects on the probability of private equity ownership than on the conditional portfolio share, a detail that the tobit models cannot identify by assumption. This finding should not be overemphasized because of the large standard errors involved, however. The results persist if the categories risk0 and risk1 are joined together to form a broader base category. 16 Poterba and Samwick (2002) actually only conduct this test for the coefficient of interest and ignore the other explanatory variables.
selection reported in Table A 
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that people with lower levels of risk aversion are more likely to invest in an own entrepreneurial firm, and less risk averse entrepreneurs invest a larger share of their asset portfolio in their own business. This finding is robust to a variety of specifications, which control for observed and unobserved characteristics and potential endogeneity of the risk attitude. The most risk tolerant individuals have an 8 times higher probability of owning private business equity than the most risk averse individuals, and the portfolio share of the most risk tolerant entrepreneurs is 31.5 % larger than that of the most risk averse entrepreneurs.
The results contribute to explaining the private equity premium puzzle. This puzzle arises from the observation that entrepreneurs invest a large share of their wealth in their own firms, despite the high risk associated with such an undiversified portfolio, and without being compensated for by a risk premium that would seem adequate for a population average level of risk aversion. The evidence found in this paper suggests that the observed undiversified portfolio structures of entrepreneurs result at least in part from self-selection of risk tolerant people into entrepreneurship. While this hypothesis has been stated in the literature, this paper provides the first empirical evidence on the positive relationship between risk tolerance and entrepreneurial investment.
Heterogeneous risk attitudes compete with credit constraints as another possible explanation for the private equity premium puzzle. In the presence of imperfect financial markets, entrepreneurs may want to diversify their portfolio by taking on debt, but external financing may be costly due to asymmetric information. This would call for government intervention in the financial markets, e.g. through subsidized venture capital. In contrast, if heterogeneous risk attitudes explain the observed undiversified portfolio structures of entrepreneurs, they may result from unconstraint individual optimization, and no government intervention is needed. While the results from this paper do not rule out that credit constraints may be at work as well, finding evidence that heterogeneous risk attitudes explain at least an important part of the puzzle certainly puts the case for government intervention into perspective. (1) 02/07 Random effects 2-limit Tobit (baseline specification) RE Tobit (2) 02/07 Random effects 2-limit Tobit, excluding net worth, gross income, and ATR RE Tobit (3) 02/07 Random effects 2-limit Tobit, risk attitude captured by dummy variables IV Tobit (4) 02/07 2-limit IV Tobit with height as IV for risk tolerance Heter. Tobit (5) 02/07 2-limit Tobit with multiplicative heteroscedasticity Tobit (6) 07 2-limit Tobit Tobit (7) 07 2-limit Tobit, excluding net worth, gross income, and ATR Tobit (8) 07 2-limit Tobit, risk attitude captured by dummy variables IV Tobit (9) 07 2-limit IV Tobit with height as IV for risk tolerance Heter. Tobit (10) 07 2-limit Tobit with multiplicative heteroscedasticity Heckit (11) 02/07 Selection model FIML estimator Heckit (12) 02/07 Selection model FIML estimator, excluding net worth, gross income, and ATR Heckit (13) 02/07 Selection model FIML estimator, risk attitude captured by dummy variables IV Heckit (14) 02/07 2-step selection model, 2 nd step: IV GMM with height as IV for risk tolerance FE Heckit (15) 02/07 2-step selection model, 2 nd step: Fixed effects estimator 
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